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Abstract
Background: Enhancing primary health care (PHC) is considered a policy priority for health systems strengthening
due to PHC’s ability to provide accessible and continuous care and manage multimorbidity. Research in PHC often
focuses on the effects of specific interventions (e.g. physicians’ contracts) in health care outcomes. This informs
narrowly designed policies that disregard the interactions between the health functions (e.g. financing and
regulation) and actors involved (i.e. public, professional, private), and their impact in care delivery and outcomes.
The purpose of this study is to analyse the interactions between PHC functions and their impact in PHC delivery,
particularly in providers’ behaviour and practice organisation.
Methods: Following a systems thinking approach with data obtained through a three-round European Delphi
process, we developed a framework that captures (1) the interactions between PHC functions by analysing
correlations between PHC characteristics of participating countries, (2) how actors involved shaped these
interactions by identifying the actor and level of devolution (or fragmentation) in the analysis, and (3) their
potential effect on care delivery by exploring panellists’ opinions.
Results: A total of 59 panellists from 24 countries participated in the first round and 76% of the initial panellists (22
countries) completed the last round. Findings show correlations between governance, financing and regulation
based on their degree of decentralisation. This is supported by panellists, who agreed that the actors involved in
health system governance determine the type of PHC financing (e.g. ownership or payment mechanisms) and
regulation (e.g. competences or gatekeeping), and this may impact care delivery and outcomes. Governance in our
framework is an overarching function whose impact in PHC delivery is mediated through the degree of
decentralisation (both delegation and devolution) of PHC financing and regulation.
Conclusions: The application of this approach in policy implementation assessment intends to uncover limitations
due to poor accountability and commitment to shared objectives. Its application in the design of health strategies
helps foresee (and prevent) undesired or unexpected effects of narrow interventions. This approach will assist in the
development of the realistic and long-term policies required for health systems strengthening.
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Background
The ‘Health for All’ movement started in the 1970s and
set the path towards the current goal of universal health
coverage. Its principles were assembled in 1978 in the
Declaration of Alma-Ata, which called for a political
commitment to implement sustainable and integrated
primary health care (PHC) as the essential care for all
the individuals in their communities [1]. The inter-
national endorsement of the declaration anticipated a
turning point in the organisation of health systems to-
wards health promotion and disease prevention, and a
multisectoral action to tackle socioeconomic determi-
nants of health. However, the political and economic in-
stability of the succeeding years hindered its
implementation. In the European area that concerns our
study, the fall of the Soviet Union left many countries in
transition in a global environment of market-driven re-
forms and constrained budget allocation to public ser-
vices [2–4]. Worldwide, the spread of HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis and malaria contributed to the loss of advo-
cates for holistic PHC in benefit of selective approaches
[5]. Selective PHC proposed more objective and ac-
countable targets to allocate health resources and, thus,
attracted the political and economic efforts required to
pursue the Alma-Ata commitments [6]. This was also
supported by the World Bank and international donors,
which played an important role in health care
agenda-setting at that time [7, 8]. The holistic PHC ap-
proach itself was also commonly misunderstood [9] – it
was either considered as inexpensive health care only
appropriate for rural areas and developing countries or
as unaffordable and utopic. It was also criticised for be-
ing focused on people’s assumed health needs instead of
looking at health demands [10].
However, the last decades witnessed a surge in health
care demands due to aging populations and multimor-
bidity [11], entailing a threat to health systems struc-
tured around specific diseases and driving the political
and public interest towards health care integration and
comprehensive PHC once again [12–14]. WHO called
for a reintroduction of PHC in the global health agenda
in 2008 [15]. Thus, efforts to strengthen PHC have con-
tinued and increased during the last decade, with a re-
newal of the stakeholders’ commitment to its
implementation in the 2018 Global Conference on Pri-
mary Health Care in Astana, Kazakhstan [16]. An inte-
grated and holistic PHC is a valuable resource for health
promotion and prevention and management of diseases
in both developed and developing countries [17], and an
ally in the achievement of universal health coverage and
sustainable development goals [18].
PHC systems have been previously described accord-
ing to Donabedian’s structure–process–outcome triad
[19] and Starfield’s PHC core attributes of accessibility,
comprehensiveness, coordination and continuity [20].
The PHC structure has been defined as the group of lo-
gistic, financial, human and infrastructural resources
that enables the process of health care delivery [19]. The
process can be understood as the act of providing and
receiving health care itself and is measured in its cap-
acity (e.g. facilities), outputs (e.g. interventions), and im-
pact on intermediate (e.g. indicators of disease
management) and immediate outcomes (e.g. health sta-
tus, equality, costs) [21–23].
Over the last 40 years, efforts to restructure and decen-
tralise health systems have emphasised the importance of
regulation and accountability in the multi-stakeholder
arena and caused growing interest in PHC and health sys-
tems governance [24–26]. The balance of actors involved
(i.e. public, professional and private) in health system
functions has been an important criterion for health sys-
tems classification and analysis of European and OECD
health systems [27–29]. In contrast, this has not gained
the same attention in the analysis of PHC [22, 30, 31]. In
multi-stakeholder health systems, it is difficult to pursue a
shared objective fuelled by the sense of belonging or affili-
ation to the same system. The importance of considering
the actors involved lies in the governing capabilities that
this involvement confers and the potential conflicts of
interest in the development of their functions [25, 32, 33].
Moreover, research in PHC performance has often fo-
cused on the impact that individual interventions (e.g.
payment mechanisms) have in care delivery and has not
considered the potential interactions between different
functions (e.g. financing and regulation) in their joint ef-
fort to deliver health care [22, 31]. Health system func-
tions, such as resource generation and service delivery, are
not performed in isolation and, thus, should not be ana-
lysed independently. The analysis of PHC with a systems
thinking approach considers the dynamism between func-
tions and actors in their synergistic effort of health care
production [34–37]. The aim of this study was to analyse
these interactions and how they may impact PHC delivery,
particularly professionals’ use of resources and practice or-
ganisation, as well as health outcomes. To achieve this, we
conducted a multi-country Delphi process, the results of
which are integrated with a literature review to define a
PHC framework that captures these interactions.
Methods
Study design
We follow a systems thinking approach, which allows a
wide perspective including different functions, actors
and their interrelations [34, 38]. A pillar of systems
thinking analysis is accounting for ‘who does what’ when
analysing the systems’ functioning. In theory, this will
help explain ‘how it is done’, based on the synergies and
dynamism between all system elements [34]. In our
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study, this pillar is captured by describing each PHC
function in terms of (1) ‘who does what’ – the actor in-
volved (i.e. public, professional, private) and degree of
devolution (e.g. central, regional) or fragmentation (e.g.
one or several bodies), and (2) ‘how is it done’ – the
mechanism employed to fulfil the function (e.g. type of
payment, type of employment status). This can be con-
sidered as a result of or cause for the type of actor in-
volved (system-as-cause thinking) [34].
This was analysed with a mixed-methods design that
combined a literature review with quantitative and quali-
tative analyses of data obtained through a three-round
multi-country Delphi process. This allowed the redefin-
ition of an initial conceptual framework (informed by
the literature) with inputs obtained through empirical
analysis of survey data and additional evidence found in
the literature.
The Delphi process is a group facilitation technique,
developed by the RAND corporation, that uses iterative
questionnaires to explore the opinions of a panel of ex-
perts or achieve consensus on a particular topic [39].
Our panel consisted of PHC academicians and physi-
cians with experience in PHC service research and based
in the WHO European Region countries, who were pur-
posively contacted following the WONCA (World
Organization of Family Doctors) Europe Branch mem-
bers list [40] and extended through snowball sampling.
This regional limitation allowed for inclusion of different
health system types while facilitating availability of com-
parable statistical data. We contacted panellists by email,
provided the study information sheet and requested their
signed informed consent for participation.
Framework development process
Figure 1 shows the framework development process.
The literature review and Delphi rounds ran from Feb-
ruary 2016 to May 2017. This included the time for ini-
tial review, panellist recruitment, survey development,
pilot, response collection, data analysis, and feedback re-
ports after the Delphi rounds.
The surveys were accessible online by invitation using
the password-locked Qualtrics service (Salt Lake City,
United States of America). The first survey was piloted
in four of the participating countries (United Kingdom,
Ireland, Germany and Spain), selected for having differ-
ent PHC characteristics, in order to check the appropri-
ateness and validity of the content in different health
system contexts.
As depicted in Fig. 1, the redefinition of the initial
framework over the first and second rounds was based
on two main activities, as described below.
Activity 1. Quantitatively examining the interrelations
between PHC functions (i.e. financing and regulation).
We obtained information on Delphi countries’ PHC
systems, which was recorded as the following categorical
and binary variables informed by the literature (e.g.
Sibthorpe and Gardner [41], Siddiqi et al. [42], Kringos
et al. [21], Mikkelsen-Lopez et al. [25], and Schäfer et al.
[43]):
1) Supply-side: health system financing; providers’
employment status and payments; facilities’
ownership; regulation of providers’ competences,
clinical practice and license conferral; guidelines;
and compulsory vocational training.
2) Demand-side: entitlements for receiving PHC, co-
payments, gatekeeping.
Activity 2. Exploring the potential impact of these
PHC functions in care delivery and outcomes. We
assessed panellist agreement with literature-based state-
ments on PHC structure, process and outcome [19] rela-
tionships using five-point Likert-scale questions.
The results of each round guided additional review in
search for evidence that supported the redefinition of
the framework. As depicted in Fig. 1, the final frame-
work was obtained after the third-round survey, which
directly asked panellists’ opinions on the functions and
interrelations shown in the framework. Additional file 1
contains a list of variables and categories used in Activ-
ity 1 and Activity 2. Additional file 4 contains the state-
ments used in Activity 2.
Search strategy
We designed broad and narrow search strategies to cap-
ture studies on health systems performance and indica-
tors, and evidence on how the PHC functions interact
and impact delivery and outcomes. These combined key-
words and MeSH terms were designed for Medline and
adapted to EMBASE, Global Health and Health Manage-
ment Information Consortium databases, and were lim-
ited to observational and review studies without
language restrictions. We used titles and abstracts to
identify relevant articles and checked their reference
lists. We also reviewed reports published by inter-
national organisations (e.g. WHO, World Bank).
Statistical analysis
We used IBM SPSS v24 for data analysis. For the de-
scription of the PHC characteristics of the Delphi panel
countries, we identified the predominant category (e.g.
main type of provider payment mechanism) and the
range of categories present in the country (e.g. all types
of provider payment mechanisms in use). When there
were several panellists from a country, we used the
mode of panellist responses. We contrasted the data col-
lected with the information available in the Health
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Systems and Policy Monitor, developed by the European
Observatory on Health Systems and Policy [44].
We calculated bivariate correlation coefficients (Pearson,
Fisher’s test and likelihood ratio, alpha significance ≤ 0.05)
to identify interrelations between any given two PHC char-
acteristics (Fig. 1, Activity 1). Significant interrelations that
were also supported by the literature constituted the basic
functional network of our framework. Missing data was ad-
dressed via pairwise deletion.
In the analysis of five-point Likert-scale questions, we
determined panel consensus when over 70% of the panel
agreed on a structure–process–outcome statement (ac-
cepted degree of consensus in reviewed literature) (Fig. 1,
Activity 2) [45]. When there were discrepancies, we ana-
lysed them against the panellist’s country PHC system
(i.e. correlating the level of agreement with panel PHC
information). This provided additional insight on the im-
pact of national contexts in the panel’s level of
Fig. 1 Study methods flow chart. MCQ multiple choice question, PHC primary health care, SPO structure–process–outcome
Espinosa-González et al. Health Research Policy and Systems           (2019) 17:65 Page 4 of 16
agreement while intending to control for self-selection
bias. Additionally, thematic analysis of panellists’ com-
ments triangulated with the literature also contributed
to establishing the functional interrelations and potential
impact in care delivery and outcomes.
Results
The process of development of the framework over the
three Delphi rounds is provided in the supplementary
materials (Additional file 2). In this section, we describe
the final framework, obtained after the final round, and
a summary of the supporting findings, obtained during
the first and second rounds. This is preceded by a de-
scription of the Delphi panel and countries.
Delphi panel description
Table 1 shows demographic and professional informa-
tion of the Delphi panel. Out of 105 invitees, 70 ac-
cepted to participate and the actual participation in the
first, second and third rounds was 59, 54 and 45 panel-
lists, respectively (attrition rate of 23.5%). Regarding
countries’ representation, 24 WHO European region
countries, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Israel, North Macedonia, Malta,
Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United
Kingdom, were represented in the first and second
rounds and 22 countries (the initial panel except
Bulgaria and Slovenia) completed the final round.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 depicts some of the characteristics of
the countries’ PHC systems.
Development of the framework
The initial literature review pointed out the relevance of
financing, regulation and provision functions and type of
actors involved (i.e. public, professional, private) for
health systems analysis [27–29]. The initial framework
included three broad functional blocks, namely (1)
health system governance, characterised by the main
health system financing mechanism, since it is inform-
ative on health system governing actors (i.e. relative role
of state in governance) [46–48], (2) PHC financing of
provision (staff and facilities) and reception (entitle-
ments) of care, and (3) PHC regulation of provision
(staff and facilities) and reception (demand) of care.
Framework description
The final framework (Fig. 5) was obtained after the ana-
lysis of the third Delphi round. A total of 97% of the
panel agreed that governance function (e.g. goals,
policy-making, and definition of financing and regulatory
mechanisms) impacts PHC delivery, particularly at prac-
tice level, but also at provider level [32, 49]. Additionally,
89% of the panel also agreed that these governing func-
tions would be shaped by the balance of actors involved
in their development “as the shadow reflects the body”
(panellist’s comment) [27, 50].
Moreover, as depicted in Fig. 5, the results suggest that
PHC financing and regulation are interrelated (e.g. type
of regulation of providers depends on how and to whom
Table 1 Delphi panel description
Information Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Participation 59 54 45
Age
< 35 5 (8.5%) 5 (9.4%) 5 (11%)
35–50 19 (32%) 16 (30%) 13 (29%)
51–70 34 (59%) 33 (61%) 27 (60%)
Current position(s) (panellists may hold more than one position)
Primary health care physician 41 (71%) 38 (70%) 30 (67%)
Primary health care researcher/academician 44 (75%) 40 (74%) 32 (71%)
Professional association representative 22 (37%) 21 (39% 14 (31%)
Family medicine training body representative 17 (29%) 17 (31%) 14 (31%)
Health care manager/director 4 (5.8%) 4 (7.4%) 4 (8.9%)
Academic background
Master’s degree 19 (32%) 17 (31%) 13 (29%)
PhD degree 28 (48%) 26 (48%) 19 (42%)
Medical specialisation in Family Medicine or other
2–4 years in length 33 (56%) 30 (57%) 26 (58%)
> 4 years in length 13 (22%) 13 (24%) 9 (20%)
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they are contracted, or regulation of facilities distribu-
tion and equipment depends on the type of facilities
ownership) [24]. Particularly, 89% of the panellists
agreed that provider payment mechanisms have a role in
the regulation of provider performance. This is based on
an alignment between the actor responsible for financing
(e.g. insurer or public institution contracting providers or
developing infrastructure) and for regulation (e.g. profes-
sional or public institution in charge of training and compe-
tences development), who ultimately, as panellists agreed,
influence how these functions are implemented [24, 32, 51].
Overall, 80% of the panel agreed that this could impact
PHC delivery processes at provider level (i.e. technical care,
resource management, accountability, job satisfaction and
doctor–patient relationships) [52] and PHC practices at re-
gional level (i.e. Starfield’s core attributes of accessibility,
comprehensiveness, continuity, and coordination) [53], and
ultimately impact outcomes, particularly health care quality,
equality and costs (identified in Kringos et al. [21]) (Fig. 5).
As panellists pointed out and the literature supports
[54, 55], quantifying the type of actor responsible for gov-
ernance, financing and regulation is equivalent to
quantifying their degree of decentralisation (both delega-
tion – or autonomisation – and devolution) of the func-
tions. The degree of decentralisation has been considered
an indicator of health care governance [21, 42]. Then, as
illustrated in Fig. 5, governance can be understood as an
overarching function [25, 34, 47], whose impact in PHC
delivery is mediated through the degree of decentralisation
of financing and regulation [51]. Hence, PHC financing
and regulation are secondary functions identified as ‘Imple-
mentation of Governance’ in our framework, as 93% of the
panel agreed.
Supporting findings
The final framework was supported by first and second
Delphi round findings. When examining the interrela-
tions between functions and actors (Fig. 1, Activity 1),
governance (i.e. health system financing mechanism
used as proxy of governing actors, as indicated before)
was correlated to both PHC regulation, such as type of
institution regulating physicians’ clinical practice (Pear-
son correlation (PC) = 0.519, p = 0.009) and conferring
the license (PC = 0.493, p = 0.014), and PHC financing
Fig. 2 Selected health systems and primary health care (PHC) characteristics of Delphi panel countries. When several types of a health system or
PHC characteristic are present in a country, the predominant category type is shown. NHS national health service, NHI national health insurance,
SHI social health insurance, OOP out of pocket, PHC primary healthcare
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such as physicians’ employment status (PC = 0.410, p =
0.047) and facilities’ ownership (PC = 0.592, p = 0.002).
For example, in our Delphi panel, the national health
service type was correlated to having public employee
physicians (PC = 0.410, p = 0.047), government owner-
ship of facilities (PC = 0.655, p = 0.001), having phys-
ician competence and licenses regulated by public
institutions (PC = 0.434, p = 0.034 and PC = 0.480, p =
0.018, respectively), and clinical practice regulated by
employer institutions (PC = 0.607, p = 0.002). Social
health insurance (single or several funds) types were cor-
related to having self-employed physicians (PC = 0.434, p =
0.034), fee for service (FFS) payments (PC = 0.747, p =
0.000), and physicians’ clinical practice regulated by a pro-
fessional college (PC = 0.513, p = 0.010). The financing and
regulatory functions have been previously included as gov-
erning mechanisms [42, 46, 47]; for example, Sidiqi et al.
[42] identified contractual arrangements and incentives,
regulation of physicians and the role of the Ministry of
Health in these as governance indicators.
As depicted in Fig. 5, PHC financing and regulation
were also interrelated. For example, facility ownership
(i.e. a PHC financing indicator) correlated to the type of
institution regulating physicians’ competences and clin-
ical practice (i.e. PHC regulation indicators) (PC = 0.481,
p = 0.017 and PC 0.418, p = 0.042, respectively). Actu-
ally, Crampton and Starfield [53] identified the govern-
ing and regulatory capabilities attributed to facility
ownership, as well as Hsiao [56], who also pointed out
that ownership can “determine to whom and for what an
organisation is held accountable”. In this way, govern-
ment ownership correlated to public institution regulat-
ing physicians’ clinical practice and licenses (PC = 0.540,
p = 0.006 and PC = 0.467, p =0.022, respectively), or pri-
vate non-professional ownership correlated to lack of clin-
ical practice regulation of physicians (PC = 0.692, p =
0.000) in our panel (see Additional file 3 for correlations
table with additional results).
When exploring the potential impact of financing and
regulatory functions in care delivery and outcomes
(Fig. 1, Activity 2), we classified the statements accord-
ing to the function they referred to (i.e. governance, fi-
nancing or regulation), and subclassified them according
to the delivery attributes (i.e. access, coordination,
Fig. 3 Selected health systems and primary health care (PHC) characteristics of Delphi panel countries. When several types of a health system or
PHC characteristic are present in a country, the predominant category type is shown. NHS national health service, NHI national health insurance,
SHI social health insurance, OOP out of pocket, PHC primary healthcare
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comprehensiveness or continuity) and outcomes alluded
to in the statements (Table 2).
Table 3 shows examples of the statements’ analysis
(Additional file 4 contains all statements). PHC finan-
cing may affect providers’ job satisfaction and impact
quality. For example, 91% of the panellists agreed that
self-employed physicians (i.e. type of employment status
included in PHC financing) are attributed additional
management and bureaucratic work compared to public
physicians (Table 3, statement one), leading to burn-out.
This links PHC financing (i.e. employment status) with
physician workload, which may impact job satisfaction
and quality of care [30]. According to panellists, this
contributes to the low take-up of family medicine/gen-
eral practice residence among medical students. Profes-
sional behaviour can also be affected. For example, 75%
of the panel agreed on the influence that patient entitle-
ments (i.e. a demand-side PHC financing indicator) may
have on physician behaviour and lead to an unjustified
increase in access to services and health care costs
(Table 3, statement two). Panellist comments pointed out
the importance of physicians’ competences and ethics, on
the one hand, and of doctor–patient communication, on
the other, in mitigating this influence. This is supported
by the correlations between patient entitlements and
physician regulation identified with Activity 1 (Fig. 1).
Potential misalignment of actors should be considered
when implementing regulation and exercising account-
ability [30, 52]. In statement three, 71% of the panel
agreed that the institution holding physicians account-
able for their clinical practice should be the same with
the institution developing guidelines to avoid inconsist-
ency between the practices regulated and recommended.
This ultimately may lead to an increase in care quality
[32] (Table 3, statement three). Regarding practice level
organisation, 89% of the panel agreed on the role of the
state in decreasing inequalities in access to services [57],
which links PHC regulation to accessibility and equality
of care delivery (Table 3, statement four). Similarly, 87%
of the panel agreed on the role of the state in facilitating
the coordination between health services, which may im-
pact the quality of care (Table 3, statement five).
In general, as depicted in Fig. 6, panellists agreed that
PHC financing may impact care costs by influencing
Fig. 4 Selected health systems and primary health care (PHC) characteristics of Delphi panel countries. When several types of a health system or
PHC characteristic are present in a country, the predominant category type is shown. NHS national health service, NHI national health insurance,
SHI social health insurance, OOP out of pocket, PHC primary healthcare
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service accessibility, and impact equality through its in-
fluence in comprehensiveness and accessibility of PHC
[58]. PHC regulation may impact care quality by influen-
cing services coordination, and equality by influencing
PHC accessibility and comprehensiveness [59]. Govern-
ing actors may influence care quality via shared goals,
accountability and organisational justice processes, and
equality by influencing accessibility of PHC [58].
To illustrate our approach, Table 4 compares a pos-
sible national strategy to increase the PHC role in dia-
betes management in two countries – Spain, which has
a public devolved health system, and Slovakia, which has
a compulsory competitive insurance model [44]. In
Spain, policy dialogue and planning have the central and
regional Ministries of Health (MoH) as main actors, ad-
vised by the professional organisations and patient
groups (Table 4). Since there is no purchaser–provider
split, financing mechanisms for the implementation by
the regional MoH would involve refinement of pro-
viders’ contract and incentives and, as the owner of PHC
facilities, adjustment of equipment and skill-mix for dia-
betes management. Regulatory mechanisms, also by the
regional MoH, would be encompassed within providers’
contracts. The general MoH supervises and provides
clinical guidelines jointly with professional organisations
(Table 4) [44]. In Slovakia, policy dialogue and planning
PHC SYSTEM
HEALTH SYSTEM GOVERNANCE
Governing actors/ health system financing context
Degree of decentralisation
HEALTH SYSTEM
PHC OUTCOMES
Quality / Equality/ Cost
PHC STRUCTURE
Provider level
Practice and regional level
PHC DELIVERY PROCESS
Resource management / Doctor–patient relationship / Accountability /
Job satisfaction /Technical care
Accessibility/ Comprehensiveness/ Continuity/ Coordination
IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNANCE
Degree of decentralisation of functions:
- delegation/autonomization (public, professional, private sector)
- devolution or fragmentation (regional, national, single, several)
PHC demand
- Entitlements to access PHC, benefit package
- Co-payments (visit, prescriptions, tests)
PHC FINANCING
Type of actors: Degree of decentralisation
PHC supply
- Provider: employment status, contracts and 
payment mechanism
- Facilities ownership
PHC REGULATION
Type of actors: Degree of decentralisation
PHC supply
- Provider: clinical practice, competences, 
license, training, guidelines
- Facilities: distribution, equipment
PHC demand
- Type of gatekeeping 
Fig. 5 Primary health care (PHC) final framework
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would involve MoH, health insurance companies (HICs),
the health care surveillance authority (HCSA) and med-
ical chambers [44]. Financing mechanisms for the imple-
mentation would require HICs to adjust providers’
contracts and incentives. Providers, as owners of facil-
ities, would be responsible for adequate equipment and
skill-mix. The implementation would be supervised by
the HCSA and self-governing regions (SGRs), the latter
in charge of providing the permits to HICs, practices
and providers (Table 4) [44]. Regulatory mechanisms
would be implemented by the HCSA and SGRs, who
supervise the quality of providers and facilities, along
with the medical chambers, who regulate providers’
competences. The HICs supervise the providers’ clinical
practice, which is informed by MoH clinical guidelines
(Table 4) [44].
Discussion
We have applied a systems thinking approach to analyse
the impact of PHC structure in delivery, particularly in
providers’ use of resources and practice organisation,
and outcomes, which were gaps identified in the litera-
ture [23]. Governance in our framework would impact
PHC delivery through the secondary functions of PHC
financing and regulation, whereas the level of decentral-
isation of these determines the way in which health sys-
tem governance is implemented [55]. As panellists
agreed, the degree of decentralisation may determine the
policy-making process (e.g. share of public–private
actors may affect health system’s goals and objectives,
including the relevance of equity among them) [50], and
influence care delivery through types of contracts and
ownership (‘hard governance’) or regulatory and pay-
ment mechanisms (‘soft governance’) [48, 49]. This can
affect physicians’ management of resources, job satisfaction
and accountability, and influence the accessibility (e.g. facil-
ities and providers’ distribution and co-payments), coordin-
ation and comprehensiveness (skill-mix, equipment) of the
PHC provided [50].
Applying a systems thinking approach when designing
policies or evaluating specific interventions helps foresee
(and prevent) or interpret the effects of these interventions
at levels different to those initially targeted [35, 36, 57]. For
example, resistance to the diabetes strategy in Slovakia
could be higher than in Spain since secondary care physi-
cians are also independent providers, with FFS income, and
could oppose its implementation or any type of gatekeeping
due to competing interests (Table 4). In Spain, most of sec-
ondary and tertiary care is public and paid on a salary basis,
which facilitates the working gatekeeping. Emphasising in-
clusive policy dialogue with secondary and tertiary care
providers (in the Slovakia case but also important in Spain)
could create a positive environment for developing shared
goals and care coordination pathways, and promoting gate-
keeping implementation (Table 4) [60].
In PHC performance analysis and comparison, our
framework also intends to reveal limitations in health sys-
tem functioning (e.g. in policy implementation or adher-
ence to guidelines) drawn from poor communication,
Table 2 Agreement with functions (financing, regulation, governance) during the Delphi process
Functions First round statements agreement Second round statements agreement Third round questions agreement
Financing 7statements 8 statements 12 short questions
Agreement (%)
- ≥70% 1/7 3/8 9/12
- 65-70% 2/7 1/8 3/12
- 60-65% 1/7 0/8 0/12
Regulation 7 statements 5 statements 10 short questions
Agreement (%)
- ≥70% 2/7 5/5 10/10
- 65-70% 0/7 0/5 0/10
- 60-65% 0/7 1/5 0/10
Governance (actors) 4 statements 5 statements 12 short questions
Agreement (%)
- ≥ 70% 0/4 2/5 12/12
- 65-70% 3/4 0/5 0/12
- 60-65% 0/4 0/5 0/12
Overall agreement 18 statements 18 statements 34 short questions
- ≥ 70% 3/18 10/18 31/34
- 65-70% 5/18 1/18 3/34
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accountability or commitment to shared goals, and may
inform interventions to improve local and regional health
care management [26, 49, 59]. For example, providers’ ad-
herence to the diabetes guidelines issued by the MoH in
Slovakia would be advocated by the medical chambers
and operationalised by HICs (Table 4) since these are the
organisations to whom providers may feel more directly
accountable. Likewise, PHC delivery can be also perturbed
if the direct responsibility for care provision relies with
professional or private actors, e.g. self-employed physi-
cians made responsible to guarantee geographical access
or affordable care. This may directly impact the distribu-
tion of facilities or provision of specific services with
population and individuals’ health repercussions, and re-
quire policy action, even more when health care is
financed with public resources. For example, SGRs in
Slovakia are responsible for ensuring health care accessi-
bility, even with direct provision, if HICs or providers
leave gaps (Table 4).
In multiple-stakeholder health systems, it is difficult to
pursue a shared objective fuelled by the sense of belong-
ing or affiliation to the same system [50]. The degree of
decentralisation can be understood as an indicator of
alignment of objectives between the actors involved.
However, it is important to mention that decentralisa-
tion of health systems is founded in different rationales.
It may be based on the cultural background of the coun-
try, and then it would represent trust between health
systems actors and recognition of their legitimacy to par-
ticipate [26, 50, 54]. It may have a political rationale and
Table 3 The impact of governance in primary health care delivery: a systems thinking approach with a European panel
Statement examples Correlation between agreement
/disagreement and panel PHC background
Thematic analysis (aspect of structure-
process-outcome referred in the statement)
1. Setting up and managing PHC practices constitute additional
workload for self-employed PHC physicians, compared with
public employee physicians. A: 91% N: 5% D: 4%
A: SHI financing mechanism, self-employed
physicians, compulsory training.
Structure: PHC financing; Process: Job
satisfaction; Outcomes: Quality
Comment example: “Practice management is a job. In France, new practices trying
to put preventive care forward struggle because of the additional workload (e.g.,
asking for funds, meeting representatives, motivating other practitioners toward new
health .care practices, etc)” (agree)
Comment example: “Public PHC centres have administrative staff and director, in
private PHC there is none and one GP makes this part of the job (or it is externalised,
which increases costs)” (agree)
2. Private patients' expectations for diagnostic and treatment
activities can be high as they feel they are contributing more
to the care they receive, and this may lead to unnecessary
interventions or treatments.
A: 75% N: 13% D: 12%
A: Private ownership, lack of NHS contracts. Structure: Patients’ entitlements
(employment status, payments); Process:
Access; Outcome: CostsLevel of agreement: OOP (no significant
differences between subgroups)
Comment example: "When patients go to doctors privately, it is almost as if the
doctor has to give the patients their "money's worth" (agree)
Comment example: “It depends on the degree of patient’s relationship with their
physician and their educational level” (disagree)
3. When physicians are monitored on their clinical practice,
the same organisation that monitors them should provide
clinical guidelines to support them (in order to ensure some
consistency between the guidelines and the clinical practice
monitored!). A: 71% N:10% D: 19%
A: PHI or OOP coverage, competence
regulated, physicians’ competences
regulated by central or regional.
Structure: PHC regulation; Process:
Accountability, Compliance; Outcomes:
Quality
D: General taxation entitlements, lack of
OOP or PHI entitlements, lack of
competences regulation
Comment example: “However, the guidelines must be done with physicians’
approval or it will lead to a direct conflict…” (agree)
Comment example: “They should count on national guidelines” (disagree)
4. Public planning of the distribution of PHC services can
help decrease the inequalities in access to PHC in a country.
A: 89% N: 9% D: 2%
A: Civil servants, lack of FFS payments, type of
institution conferring the license to practice.
Structure: PHC regulation; Process:
Access; Outcomes: Equality
Comment example: “Self-organisation leads to less and less GPs working in deprived and
poor area. Public health centres allowed to increase the number of GPs in those areas” (agree)
Comment example: “We must pay attention to freedom of exercise in case of public
planning” (disagree)
5. The coordination of PHC physicians with other specialists/
hospital services can be difficult. Health authorities should
establish clear links and pathways to make this coordination
easier. A: 87% N: 5% D: 8%
A: Contracted to NHS or NHI, capitation and
performance payment mixed.
Structure: PHC regulation; Process:
Coordination; Outcomes: Quality
D: SHI several funds financing, FFS payments
Comment example: “Clear and easy to follow” (agree)
Comment example: “This will generally increase the bureaucratic workload” (disagree)
A: Agreement, N: Neither agreement nor disagreement, D: Disagreement
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attempt to represent different actors’ interests. Finally, it
may seek to impact performance, aligned to other pol-
icies to increase responsiveness and efficiency of health
systems. When assessing decentralisation processes, ei-
ther the achievement of legitimacy, interest representa-
tion or performance may be used as indicators, and
using the three of them is recommended [54].
Delphi methods are appropriate for model develop-
ment; however, there are some recognised limitations
[39]. The strength of the study partly depends on the
strength of the panel. Panellists’ inclusion was based on
their experience in PHC (e.g. clinicians, managers) and
commitment to the study. This contributed to internal
validity through panel heterogeneity and low attrition
rate; however, their level of expertise on the topic of
study may differ. This was addressed with definition of
core concepts, informed feedback and repetition across
rounds. Researcher bias may also arise from question se-
lection and controlled feedback. This was addressed by
building on an initial framework based on the literature
as well as supporting the results with different methods
and sources of evidence (i.e. panellists’ absolute and rela-
tive agreement with statements, qualitative analysis of
comments and literature).
Additionally, the framework is tilted towards the supply
side, focused on factors that may influence physicians’ use
of resources and practice organisation and with only a few
demand-side characteristics included. Other factors
affecting PHC demand, such as socioeconomic determi-
nants, are not represented. The same is true for other
health systems organisational and financial factors influen-
cing PHC delivery, such as secondary or tertiary care
availability or expenditure. This was suggested by panel-
lists and should be accounted for when applying the
framework for performance analyses. Besides the
supply-side focus, the relationships between functions are
based on linear correlations, and this is not ideal for a sys-
tems thinking approach, for which non-linear or dynamic
modelling techniques are more appropriate [34]. This was
limited by the lack of quantitative indicators for the func-
tions observed. Considering health systems as hybrids, the
measurement of decentralisation in cross-country analyses
should reflect not only the categories available (e.g. types
of facilities’ ownership) but also their weight (e.g. percent-
age of public expenditure in facilities or FFS amount paid
to providers per each insurer). This would provide a more
comprehensive picture of the health systems; however, this
information was not available for all participating coun-
tries. Finally, we point out that the discussed impact of
governance, financing and regulation in care delivery and
outcomes (Fig. 6) is based on panellist opinions and sup-
portive literature. This is otherwise useful for generating
hypotheses, but these must be tested in future studies.
The framework is currently being applied to produce a
taxonomy of PHC systems (using information of 24 Del-
phi countries as starting point) based on different
Fig. 6 Alluvial diagram depicting the level of agreement with structure–process–outcome statements. In the analysis, statements are classified
according to the structural function referred to (i.e. governance/governing actors, regulation, financing). Subsequently, statements are classified
according to the provider’s and practice’s attributes potentially influenced by the structural function. Following this, statements are classified according
to the outcome attribute alluded to. Information is obtained through thematic analysis of the statements. Strongest colour depicts agreement over
70%, medium strength colour depicts agreement between 65% and 70%, minimum strength colour depicts agreement lower than 65%.
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degrees of decentralisation of PHC financing and regula-
tion. The next step is the comparison of the taxa on
non-communicable disease outputs and outcomes. For
single country studies, the framework can be applied to
establish within-country differences in health outputs
and outcomes as a function of the PHC characteristics
analysed using lower level data. This would be especially
relevant for countries such as Spain and the United
Kingdom, where autonomous regions or devolved gov-
ernments have significant involvement in the running of
the health system. Given quantitative data is available,
the framework can be used as the basis of a model (an
untested example using Unified Modelling Language no-
tations [61] is provided in supplementary materials, see
Additional file 5) for performance analysis with more
suitable methods. The refinement of the model after
calibration with country data would also improve the ex-
ternal validity of the framework.
Regarding the generalisability of the findings, the rela-
tionships supporting this framework were identified using
data from 24 WHO European region countries and with
the purpose of developing a taxonomy. Due to this empir-
ical approach, some health systems actors and mecha-
nisms are not represented in this study (e.g. role of
donors, non-governmental organisations or faith-based
organisations in health care). The application of this
framework to assess the implementation of health pro-
grammes or policy reforms at local, regional or national
level in other countries is encouraged and would require
previous identification of actors, financing and regulatory
Table 4 Actors and mechanisms required to implement a national strategy to increase PHC role in diabetes management
Spain Slovakia
Policy dialogue,
situation analysis,
planning
- Actors: MoH (central and ACs), providers and patient
groups (advisors)
MoEc approves budget and extra funds to support ACs
- Regional MoH: adapts policy/plan to ACs
- Actors: MoH, HICs, health care provider representatives, HCSA
Implementation
PHC Financing
- Regional MoH: inclusion of activities for diabetes
management in providers’ contracts, incentives (P4P) or non-
financial incentives, provider/practice objectives, accessibility
to PHC and availability of equipment for diagnosis/manage-
ment at PHC level, skill-mix or multidisciplinary practices, inte-
grated electronic records
- Central MoH: earmarked funds to implement strategy (if
necessary)
- HICs: inclusion of activities for diabetes management in
providers’ contracts, payment alignment (P4P or FFS),
provider/practice objectives, availability of equipment for
diagnosis/management at PHC level
- SGRs: accessibility of diagnosis and management services,
ensures minimum access via facilities ownership (mostly
hospitals)
Implementation
PHC Regulation
- Regional MoH: supervises competences and monitors
achievement of management objectives (pre-specified and
aligned to MoH guidelines)
- MoH: provides clinical guidelines, supervises implementation
is aligned with national strategy
- MoE: provides license
- Professional organisations (SEMFyC and regional branches)
collaborate with MoH for guidelines development
- HCSA: supervises MoH, HICs, SGRs, providers
- Medical chambers: regulate competences provide license
(membership not compulsory)
- SGRs: provide permits to HICs, providers and facilities
- MoH: provides clinical guidelines, develops quality indicators
- HICs: regulate diabetes management, measure quality
indicators
Resistance/
challenge
- PHC postgraduate training curriculum’s adaptation to
enhanced scope of practice (MoH, MoE and professional
associations)
- Providers’ inclusion in policy dialogue and planning
alignment of payments/incentives across health services, and
development of care pathways could enhance coordination
of diabetes management and acceptance of PHC role
- Budget constraints and competitions for public funds may
limit access to diagnostic services in PHC services
- Uneven implementation of national strategy in ACs: central
support and additional earmarked funds could aid
- Budget miscalculation for implementation and maintenance
of strategy may lead to unsustainable/temporary reforms
- Untargeted conditions (diseases not covered under specific
disease programme) may be neglected – supportive
guidelines, comprehensive PHC physicians training and
continuous education may be helpful
- PHC postgraduate training curriculum’s adaptation to
enhanced scope of practice (MoH, MoE and Medical
Chambers)
- HICs should incentivise group practices
- Secondary/inpatient care may resist gatekeeping – inclusive
policy dialogue and payments/incentives alignment across
health services may dissipate resistance
- Population resistance due to reduction of freedom of choice
– population trust for the services through raising awareness
campaign may dissipate resistance
- Distribution of providers, diagnostic and therapeutic services
for diabetes management may vary across country
- Patients/civil society representation – inclusion may improve
population awareness/acceptance of PHC
- Untargeted conditions (diseases not covered under specific
disease programme) may be neglected – supportive
guidelines, comprehensive PHC physicians training and
continuous education may be helpful
Sector-wide
approach
opportunities
- Public health programmes to tackle risk factors and
encourage healthy lifestyle – inclusion in policy dialogue and
planning
- Cross-sectorial collaboration (Health in All policies) – food,
transport
- Public health programmes to tackle risk factors and
encourage healthy lifestyle – inclusion in policy dialogue and
planning
- Cross-sectorial collaboration (Health in All policies) – food,
transport
ACs autonomous communities, FFS fee for service, HCSA Health Care Surveillance Authority, HICs health insurance companies, MoE Ministry of Education, MoEc
Ministry of Economy, MoH Ministry of Health, P4P pay for performance, SEMFyC Spanish Family and Community Medicine Society, SGRs self-governing regions
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mechanisms to analyse the existence of the interrelations
here identified. When considering only the actors here in-
cluded, we anticipate that the framework may be better
applied in contexts where the state is, to some extent,
constitutionally or legislatively responsible for population
health, and there exists a mainstream health system finan-
cing mechanism (with or without other identifiable finan-
cing mechanisms) in order to better detect actors and
accountability relationships.
Conclusions
Our framework introduces a systems thinking approach
in the analysis and comparison of PHC systems by unco-
vering the relationships between governance, financing
and regulation, which we identified on the basis of their
degree of decentralisation. The framework, which was
validated by the expert panel, is being applied to classify
countries according to the degree of decentralisation of
PHC financing and regulation and compare their per-
formance. This will provide a measure of the impact of
PHC governance in care delivery. Using the framework
in health policy implementation or performance assess-
ment intends to reveal limitations in the performance of
providers or facilities due to poor accountability and
commitment to shared objectives, and point out the
areas for improvement of health care management at
local, regional or national level [26, 62]. Recognition of
the relationships between health systems functions and a
priori identification of their degree of decentralisation
(i.e. actors involved and level of devolution or fragmen-
tation) provide valuable information on the arena in
which policies are designed and implemented, and helps
avoid shortcomings by ensuring proper integration of ac-
tors through inclusive policy dialogue and planning, and
alignment of mechanisms across health systems func-
tions [63]. Using this approach helps foresee the
cross-sectoral impact of interventions and prevent their
undesired or unexpected effects within and beyond
health systems boundaries [50, 57, 64]. This will contrib-
ute to the development of the realistic and long-term
policy solutions required for health systems strengthen-
ing and the attainment of the highest possible level of
health for all once endorsed [1, 18, 34].
Additional files
Additional file 1: List of variables and categories used in the study.
(PDF 97 kb)
Additional file 2: Evolution of the framework through three Delphi
rounds. (PDF 107 kb)
Additional file 3: Correlations between PHC characteristics of Delphi
panel countries. (PDF 176 kb)
Additional file 4: Statements classified into governance/governing
actors, financing and regulation functions. (PDF 160 Kb)
Additional file 5: Framework described using unified modelling
language notations. (PDF 659 kb)
Abbreviations
FFS: fee for service; HCSA: Health Care Surveillance Authority; HICs: health
insurance companies; MoH: Ministry of Health; P4P: pay for performance;
PC: Pearson correlation; PHC: primary health care; SGRs: self-governing
regions
Acknowledgments
The research was supported by the National Institute for Health Research
(NIHR) Imperial Biomedical Research Centre based at Imperial College Health
care NHS Trust and Imperial College London. The views expressed are those
of the authors and not necessarily those of the NIHR Imperial Biomedical
Research Centre. The research team would also like to acknowledge the
valuable contribution of the expert panel, including the following panellists
that gave their consent to be named in the article: Sandra Adalgiza Alexiu
(Romania), Radost Asenova (Bulgaria), Erika Baum (Germany), Valerija Bralić
Lang (Croatia), Petter Brelin (Norway), Sergiu Chirila (Romania), Jose M Cots
Yago (Spain), Didier Duhot (France), Merja Ellilä (Finland), Maria del Carmen
Fernández Alonso (Spain), Robert Festersen (Germany), Süleyman Görpelioğlu
(Turkey), Dilek Güldal (Turkey), Jean-Pierre Jacquet (France), Kirsti Kähärä
(Finland), Jean-Baptiste Kern (France), Oleksii Korzh (Ukraine), James Lee
(Ireland), Christos Lionis (Greece), Azeem Majeed (United Kingdom), Pierre
Mallia (Malta), Prof. Biserka Bergman Marković (Croatia), Luc Martinez (France),
Ana Maria Moragas Moreno (Spain), Brian Osborne (Ireland), Renata Pavlov
(Croatia), Alejandro Pérez Milena (Spain), Antoni Peris-Grao (Spain), Darinka
Punoseva (Serbia), François Raineri (France), Danica Rotar-Pavlič (Slovenia),
Esra Saatçi (Turkey), Yochai Schonmann (Israel), Antoni Sisó-Almirall (Spain),
Katerina Stavric (North Macedonia), Sven Streit (Switzerland), Ljubin Sukriev
(North Macedonia), İlhami Ünlüoğlu (Turkey), Leena Uusitalo (Finland),
Shlomo Vinker (Israel), and Claire Wilhelm (France).
Funding
National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Imperial Biomedical Research
Centre (BRC) based at Imperial College Health care NHS Trust and Imperial
College London (NIHR reference number for the Imperial BRC is 1215–20013).
Availability of data and materials
The datasets used and/or analysed during the current study are available
from the corresponding author on reasonable request.
Authors’ contributions
The study was designed by AEG with inputs from BD, JM and AD. AEG
conducted the study. AEG, BD, JM and AD interpreted the results. AEG wrote
the initial manuscript. AEG, BD, JM and AD contributed to the final
manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
The study was approved by the NHS Health Research Authority (IRAS project
ID: 206860) with the sponsorship of the Joint Research Compliance Office
(Imperial College Academic Health Science Centre). Panellists received the
study information sheets and signed the informed consent form before the
first round.
Consent for publication
The consent for publication was included in the informed consent form.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Author details
1Centre for Health Policy, IGHI, Department of Surgery and Cancer, Imperial
College London, Room 1035, 10th Floor Queen Elizabeth Queen Mother
Wing, St Mary’s Hospital South Wharf Road, London W2 1NY, United
Kingdom. 2Department of Surgery and Cancer, Imperial College London,
Espinosa-González et al. Health Research Policy and Systems           (2019) 17:65 Page 14 of 16
London, United Kingdom. 3Centre for Primary Care and Public Health
(Unisanté), University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland.
Received: 11 December 2018 Accepted: 23 April 2019
References
1. World Health Organization, UNICEF. Declaration of Alma-Ata. International
Conference on Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, USSR, 6-12 September 1978.
Geneva and New York: WHO; 1978.
2. Gillam S. Is the declaration of Alma Ata still relevant to primary health care?
BMJ. 2008;336(7643):536–8.
3. Lawn JE, Rohde J, Rifk S, Were M, Paul VK, Chopra M. Alma-Ata: rebirth and
revision 1 Alma-Ata 30 years on: revolutionary, relevant, and time to
revitalise. Lancet. 2008;372(9642):917–27.
4. Rifkin SB. Alma Ata after 40 years: Primary Health Care and Health for All –
from consensus to complexity. BMJ Glob Health. 2018;3(Suppl 3):e001188.
5. Walsh JA, Warren KS. Selective primary health care: an interim strategy for
disease control in developing countries. N Engl J Med. 1979;301(18):967–74.
6. Wollumbin J. Holistic primary health care – origins and history. J Aust Tradit
Med Soc. 2012;18(2):77–80.
7. Godlee F. The World Health Organization: WHO in crisis. Br Med J. 1994;
309(6966):1424–8.
8. Lidén J. The World Health Organization and global health governance: post-
1990. Public Health. 2014;128:141–7.
9. Chan M. Return to Alma-Ata. Lancet. 2008;372:865–6.
10. Hall J, Taylor R. Health for all beyond 2000: the demise of the Alma-Ata
declaration and primary health care in developing countries. Med J Aust.
2003;178:17–20.
11. Strong K, Mathers C, Leeder S, Beaglehole R. Preventing chronic diseases:
how many lives can we save? Lancet. 2005;366(9496):1578–82.
12. Kruk ME, Nigenda G, Knaul FM. Redesigning primary care to tackle the
global epidemic of noncommunicable disease. Am J Public Health. 2015;
105(3):431–7.
13. Frenk J. Reinventing primary health care: the need for systems integration.
Lancet. 2009;374(9684):170–3. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(09)60693-0.
14. Starfield B. Global health, equity, and primary care. J Am Board Fam Med.
2007;20(6):511–3.
15. World Health Organization. The World Health Report 2008 - Primary Health
Care: Now More than Ever. Geneva: WHO; 2008.
16. World Health Organization, UNICEF. Declaration of Astana. Global
Conference on Primary Health Care: from Alma-Ata Towards Universal
Health Coverage and the Sustainable Development Goals. Astana,
Kazakhstan, Oct 25-26, 2018. Geneva and New York; 2018. https://www.who.
int/docs/default-source/primary-health/declaration/gcphc-declaration.pdf.
Accessed 13 Jan 2019.
17. Beaglehole R, Epping-Jordan J, Patel V, Chopra M, Ebrahim S, Kidd M, et al.
Improving the prevention and management of chronic disease in low-
income and middle-income countries: a priority for primary health care.
Lancet. 2008;372:940–9.
18. Kruk ME, Gage AD, Arsenault C, Jordan K, Leslie HH, Roder-DeWan S, et al.
High-quality health systems in the Sustainable Development Goals era: time
for a revolution. Lancet Glob Heal. 2018;6(11):e1196–252.
19. Donabedian A. The quality of care. How can it be assessed? JAMA. 1988;
260(12):1743–8.
20. Starfield B. Measuring the attainment of primary care. J Med Educ. 1979;54:
361–9.
21. Kringos DS, Boerma WG, Bourgueil Y, Cartier T, Hasvold T, Hutchinson A, et
al. The European primary care monitor: structure, process and outcome
indicators. BMC Fam Pract. 2010;11(1):81.
22. Hogg W, Rowan M, Russell G, Geneau R, Muldoon L. Framework for primary
care organizations: the importance of a structural domain. Int J Qual Heal
Care. 2008;20(5):308–13.
23. Veillard J, Cowling K, Bitton A, Ratcliffe H, Kimball M, Barkley S, et al. Better
measurement for performance improvement in low- and middle-income
countries: the primary health care performance initiative (PHCPI) experience
of conceptual framework development and indicator selection. Milbank Q.
2017;95(4):836–83.
24. Brinkerhoff DW. Accountability and health systems: toward conceptual
clarity and policy relevance. Health Policy Plan. 2004;19(6):371–9.
25. Mikkelsen-Lopez I, Wyss K, de Savigny D. An approach to addressing
governance from a health system framework perspective. BMC Int Health
Hum Rights. 2011;11:13.
26. Davies C, Anand P, Artigas L, Holloway J, Mcconway K, Newman J, et al.
Links between Governance, Incentives and Outcomes: a Review of the
Literature. 2005. http://www.netscc.ac.uk/hsdr/files/project/SDO_FR_08-
1318-066_V01.pdf. Accessed 21 Mar 2019.
27. Rothgang H, Cacace M, Grimmeisen S, Wendt C. The changing role of the
state in health care systems. Eur Rev. 2005;13:187–212.
28. Wendt C, Frisina L, Rothgang H. Health care system types: a conceptual
framework for comparison. Soc Policy Adm. 2009;43(1):70–90.
29. Böhm K, Schmid A, Götze R, Landwehr C, Rothgang H. Five types of OECD
health care systems: empirical results of a deductive classification. Health Policy
(New York). 2013;113:258–69. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2013.09.003.
30. Cleary SM, Molyneux S, Gilson L. Resources, attitudes and culture: an
understanding of the factors that influence the functioning of
accountability mechanisms in primary health care settings. BMC Health Serv
Res. 2013;13:320.
31. Abimbola S, Negin J, Jan S, Martiniuk A. Towards people-centred health
systems: a multi-level framework for analysing primary health care
governance in low-and middle-income countries. Health Policy Plan. 2014;
29:29–39.
32. Brinkerhoff DW, Bossert TJ. Health governance: principal-agent linkages and
health system strengthening. Health Policy Plan. 2014;29(6):685–93.
33. Pollock A, Price D. Rewriting the regulations: how World Trade Organization
could accelerate privatization in health care systems. Lancet. 2000;356:1995–2000.
34. de Savigny D, Adam T. editors. Systems Thinking for Health Systems
Strengthening. Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research, World
Health Organization. Geneva: WHO; 2009.
35. Adam T. Advancing the application of systems thinking in health. Health
Res Policy Syst. 2014;12:50.
36. Atun R, Menabde N. Health systems and systems thinking. In: Coker R, Atun
R, Mckee M, editors. Health Systems and the Challenge of Communicable
Diseases. Maidenhead: Open University Press; 2008.
37. Atun R, De Jongh T, Secci F, Ohiri K, Adeyi O. Integration of targeted health
interventions into health systems: a conceptual framework for analysis.
Health Policy Plan. 2010;25:104–11.
38. Best A, Clark P, Leischow S, Trochim W. Greater Than the Sum: Systems
Thinking in Tobacco Control. Bethesda: National Cancer Institute, US
Department of Health and Human Services; 2007. https://cancercontrol.cancer.
gov/brp/tcrb/monographs/18/m18_complete.pdf. Accessed 9 May 2019.
39. Landeta J. Current validity of the Delphi method in social sciences. Technol
Forecast Soc Change. 2006;73(5):467–82.
40. WONCA Europe. Member Organisations. 2019. http://www.woncaeurope.
org/member-organisations. Accessed 2 Apr 2019.
41. Sibthorpe B, Gardner K. A conceptual framework for performance
assessment in primary health care. Aust J Prim Health. 2007;13(2):96–103.
42. Siddiqi S, Masud TI, Nishtar S, Peters DH, Sabri B, Bile KM, et al. Framework
for assessing governance of the health system in developing countries:
gateway to good governance. Health Policy (New York). 2009;90(1):13–25.
43. Schäfer WL, Boerma WG, Kringos DS, De Maeseneer J, Gress S, Heinemann
S, et al. QUALICOPC, a multi-country study evaluating quality, costs and
equity in primary care. BMC Fam Pract. 2011;12:115.
44. European Observatory on Health Systems and Policy. The Health Systems
and Policy Monitor. WHO Regional Office for Europe. 2019. https://www.
hspm.org/mainpage.aspx. Accessed 6 Nov 2018.
45. Diamond IR, Grant C, Feldman M, Pencharz PB, Ling SC, Moore AM, et al.
Defining consensus: a systematic review recommends methodologic criteria
for reporting of Delphi studies. J Clin Epidemiol. 2014;67(4):401–9.
46. Murray CJL, Frenk J. A framework for assessing the performance of health
systems. Bull World Health Organ. 2000;78(6):717–31.
47. World Health Organization. Everybody’s Business: Strengthening Health
Systems to Improve Health Outcomes: WHO’s Framework for Action. 2007.
http://www.who.int/healthsystems/strategy/everybodys_business.pdf.
Accessed 16 Aug 2017
48. Wendt C, Agartan TI, Kaminska ME. Social health insurance without
corporate actors: changes in self-regulation in Germany, Poland and Turkey.
Soc Sci Med. 2013;86:88–95. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.02.044.
49. Kuhlmann E, Allsop J. Professional self-regulation in a changing architecture
of governance:comparing health policy in the UK and Germany. Policy Polit.
2008;36(2):173–89.
Espinosa-González et al. Health Research Policy and Systems           (2019) 17:65 Page 15 of 16
50. Leppo K, Ollila E, Peña S, Wismar M, Cook S. Health in All Policies: Seizing
Opportunities, Implementing Policies. 2013. http://www.euro.who.int/__data/
assets/pdf_file/0007/188809/Health-in-All-Policies-final.pdf. Accessed 29 Sep 2017.
51. Lewis M, Pettersson GG. Governance in Health Care Delivery. Policy
Research Working Papers. 2009. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/792741468330936271/pdf/WPS5074.pdf. Accessed 16 Aug 2017.
52. Lanier DC, Martin R, Burstin H, Knottnerus JA. Doctor performance and
public accountability. Lancet. 2003;362(9393):1404–8.
53. Crampton P, Starfield B. A case for government ownership of primary care
services in New Zealand: weighing the arguments. Int J Health Serv. 2004;
34(4):709–27.
54. Saltman RB, Bankauskaite V, Vrangbæk K. Decentralization in Health Care.
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies Series. Maindehead:
Open University Press; 2007.
55. Rechel B, Duran A, Saltman R. What is the experience of decentralized
hospital governance in Europe? 2018. http://www.euro.who.int/en/about-
us/partners/observatory/publications/policy-briefs-and-summaries/what-is-
the-experience-of-decentralized-hospital-governance-in-europe. Accessed 9
May 2019.
56. Hsiao W. What is a health system? Why should we care? Harvard T.H. Chan
School of Public Health; 2003. https://www.mediastudies.fpzg.hr/_
download/repository/Hsiao2003.pdf. Accessed 9 May 2019.
57. Shankardass K, Renahy E, Muntaner C, O’campo P. Strengthening the
implementation of Health in All Policies: a methodology for realist
explanatory case studies. Health Policy Plan. 2015;30:462–73.
58. Groenewegen PP, Dourgnon P, Greß S, Jurgutis A, Willems S, Greß S, et al.
Strengthening weak primary care systems: steps towards stronger primary care
in selected Western and Eastern European countries. Health Policy (New York).
2013;113(1–2):170–9. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2013.05.024.
59. Rico A, Saltman RB, Boerma WGW. Organizational restructuring in European
health systems: the role of primary care. Soc Policy Adm. 2003;37(6):592–
608.
60. Hämäläinen R-M, Aro AR, Lau CJ, Rus D, Cori L, Syed AM. Cross-sector
cooperation in health-enhancing physical activity policymaking: more
potential than achievements? Health Res Policy Syst. 2016;14:33.
61. Roff JT. UML A Beginner’s Guide. Berkeley: McGraw-Hill; 2003.
62. Gilson L, Raphaely N. The terrain of health policy analysis in low and middle
income countries: a review of published. Health Policy Plan. 2008;23:294–307.
63. Adam T, de Savigny D. Systems thinking for strengthening health systems in
LMICs: need for a paradigm shift. Health Policy Plan. 2012;27(Suppl 4):iv1–3.
64. Paina L, Peters DH. Understanding pathways for scaling up health services
through the lens of complex adaptive systems. Health Policy Plan. 2012;27:
365–73.
Espinosa-González et al. Health Research Policy and Systems           (2019) 17:65 Page 16 of 16
